

Can Japan Change?: Abenomics and Its Future

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Two Faces of Abenomics

- * A. Abenomics as Politics
 - * Three A's: Abe, Aso, and Amari
 - * Abe->the first arrow; reflationary policy
 - * Aso->the second arrow; “old-fashioned” pork barrel fiscal stimulus
 - * Amari-> the third arrow; industrial, target policy
 - * Abe's reliance on METI
- * B. Abenomics as Economics


Abe's Political Strategy

- * Cautious, patient, yet resolute
- * Fights against the BOJ, avoids fighting against the MOF, seeks help from the METI
- * The BOJ front: adoption of inflation targeting, appointment of reflationary governor and deputy governor, Haruhiko Kuroda and Kikuo Iwata.
 - * Revision of the BOJ law?

A “Policy Regime Shift” (Romer 2013)

- * Contrast with the 2001-06 (original) QE experience
- * The Old Regime: accepting deflation
 - * Long on excuses, short on action
 - * No explicit inflation targeting
 - * The BOJ people
- * The New Regime: fighting deflation
 - * Emphasis on Expected inflation
 - * Inflation targeting
 - * New people: Kuroda and Iwata

How Abenomics Works



How Kuroda Thinks

- * Sense of history (Kuroda 2005)
- * A macroeconomic policy interpretation of the Japan's long stagnation
- * Deflation: distinction between Legal responsibility and economic causes (Kuroda 2005, 173-183)
- * The role of exchange rate: quite important
- * bubble: Too much expansionary monetary could lead to a bubble (Kuroda 2005, 90), but bursting a bubble was a more serious mistake (Kuroda 2005, 100-102)
- * Fiscal consolidation

Risks

- * 1. The First Arrow: Could it reach the target?
- * 2. The Second Arrow: What is the Impact of the consumption tax hike?
- * 3. The Third Arrow: Would it even fly?
- * 4. Redistribution, the Missing Fourth Arrow?
- * 5. External Environment: Would the World Economy favors Abenomics?
- * 6. Media: Do they change their mind?
- * 7. Politics as Ultimate Risk: Would Abe Survive?

1. The BOJ Front

- * Right now: they are quite satisfied with their policy
- * Most likely further action in the case of a drastic fall in expected inflation rate, i.e., **change in policy purpose most unlikely**
- * More tools?
 - * Increase the purchase of volume of long-term JGBs
 - * Purchase of other assets, more likely ETF
 - * Purchase of foreign bonds **off the table**
 - * “Forward Guidance”?
- * Change in policy target? **Less likely now.**
 - * Targeting nominal GDP, Unemployment Rate

2.The Consumption Tax Hike

- * Negative effects expected
- * **Permanent** ¥8 trn. Negative impact from FY 2014
- * **Temporary** Offsetting Stimulus package ¥5trn.
- * The Repetition of the 1937 US, or 2010 UK?

3. The Growth “Strategy”

- * Two different economic policy philosophies
- * A. METI: Old style industrial, export-oriented, target policy with government sponsored funds
- * B. Heizo Takenaka and market-oriented reformers
 - * Deregulation, private management of public facilities, corporate reform (outside board member)
 - * So far, retreat of market-oriented reformer camp

Things to come: Next Regime?

Open Regime	Closed Regime
Rule, Framework	Discretion, Planning from above
Pro-market	Pro-business
Welcomes new entry	Discourages new entry
Competition policy	Industrial policy
Tax cuts, deregulation	Subsidies, reregulation
More Economics	Less Economics

Impacts of Abenomics

- * The First Arrow, and TPP are the main pillars.
- * With deflation to 2% inflation in 2 years: Phillips curve + Okun's Law
 - * Unemployment: $4.3 + 0.5 = 4.8\%$ (2012) to 2.5% (2014)
 - * Okun coefficient: 3
 - * Real GDP growth rate: 6.9 % increase in two years
- * The Second Arrow: about 0.6% increase in one year

Impacts of Reform?

- * TPP:
 - * 0.8% increase in growth rate (with all tariffs abolished)
 - * 2% (Peter Petri, with all non-tariff barriers abolished)
- * Others?
 - * Regulatory reforms have positive impact on growth rate (Haidar 2012)
 - * Past experiences are not encouraging (Hoshi and Kashyap 2011, 2012)
- * But, reasons to be a bit more optimistic: the First arrow matters on the growth front as well

Can We Change?

- * “God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference” (Reinhold Niebuhr)/

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